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A relation between irreversibility and unlinkability
for biometric template protection algorithms
Manabu Inuma
Abstract. For biometric recognition systems, privacy protection of en-
rolled users’ biometric information, which are called biometric templates, is a
critical problem. Recently, various template protection algorithms have been
proposed and many related previous works have discussed security notions
to evaluate the protection performance of these protection algorithms. Irre-
versibility and unlinkability are important security notions discussed in many
related previous works. In this paper, we prove that unlinkability is a stronger
security notion than irreversibility.
1. Introduction
Biometrics is a technique which automatically recognizes an individual by us-
ing his/her physical or behavioral characteristics such as ﬁngerprints, face, vein
pattern, (on-line or oﬀ-line) handwriting, or gait. A biometric recognition system
stores biometric features extracted from each user’s biometric characteristic. The
stored biometric features of each user is called a (biometric) template. During ver-
iﬁcation, it compares freshly extracted biometric features with stored biometric
features and decides whether these two biometric feature sets originate in the same
user or not. Biometric features extracted from a user’s biometric characteristic are
strongly linked to the user and almost unchangeable during his/her lifetime. Once
biometric features of a user are leaked together with the user’s identity, he/she will
face a severe risk of identity theft. Moreover, biometric features often contain sen-
sitive privacy information about the user. To solve these security problems, some
traditional biometric authentication system utilizes a symmetric-key or public-key
encryption scheme (Enc,Dec), where Enc and Dec are the encryption and decryp-
tion algorithms, respectively. During enrollment, the system encrypts each user’s
biometric features x into a cyphertext Enc(x) and stores it in some storage de-
vice, and, during veriﬁcation, decrypts Enc(x) into the original biometric features
x = Dec(Enc(x)) and compares x with freshly extracted biometric features x′.
However, such a traditional system has the problem that the adversary who knows
all algorithms and all keys utilized in the system can easily recover the original bio-
metric features x from a cyphertext Enc(x), even if he does not present biometric
features x′ suﬃciently close to x. For example, a malicious administrator of the
biometric system might recover user’s biometric features and abuse them.
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A biometric template protection (BTP ) algorithm (see Def. 2 in Sect. 4) is a
primitive mechanism for constructing a system in which only the individual pre-
senting biometric features suﬃciently similar to the enrolled biometric features can
recover the enrolled features from the protected template and can be successfully
veriﬁed, or which completes the veriﬁcation without revealing the enrolled features.
Recently, many BTP algorithms (cf. [2, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18]) have been
proposed and various security notions (cf. [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 16]) have been
discussed in some related previous works. Two important security notions, irre-
versibility and unlinkability, are addressed in most related previous works. Inuma,
Otsuka [5] show that unlinkability is a stronger notion than irreversibility, namely
unlinkability implies irreversibility. However, they do not give the proof of this
statement due to limitation of pages and will describe the proof in the full version
paper. In this paper, as a preparation for the full version paper, we introduce
simpler formalizations of irreversibility and unlinkability for BTP algorithms (see
Def. 5 in Sect. 5 and Def. 7 in Sect. 6) and give the proof for the relationship between
the security notions (see Theorem9 in Sect. 7).
We introduce the minimum entropy (cf. [3, 4]) for a biometric recognition
system, which is deﬁned as the amount of information unavailable to the computa-
tionally unbounded adversary who attempts to guess biometric features which are
decided, by the biometric recognition system, to match biometric features extracted
from a randomly chosen user’s biometric characteristic (see Def. 1 in Sect. 3). Our
formalization of the security notions employs the minimum entropy as the security
parameter. In the real world, since most existing biometric recognition systems
do not have suﬃciently large minimum entropy1 and many large databases of bio-
metric samples are available to the public, the adversary who obtains a protected
template can recover the original biometric features by exhaustive database search.
To compensate the insuﬃciency of biometric recognition systems, some previous
works (cf. [1, 5, 6, 15]) require secrecy of protected templates. For example, the
International Standard ISO/IEC 24745 [6] and Inuma, Otsuka [5] require that each
protected template should be decomposed into two data, a pseudonymous identifier
(PI ) and an auxiliary data (AD ), and these two data should be (logically or physi-
cally) separately stored. However, in this paper, we do not address insuﬃciency of
the entropy for existing modalities and the separation of protected templates. We
only focus on mathematically proving the relationship between irreversibility and
unlinkability.
1 Surprisingly, Une, Otsuka, Imai [11] report that the success probability of a strong presentation
attack, which is called wolf attack, to a fingerprint recognition system [13] is larger than 2−0.8,
namely the minimum entropy of the fingerprint recognition system is smaller than 0.8.
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2. Notions and Preliminaries
For any random variable X on a (finite) setM, the notation x← X denotes an
event that x is chosen according to X. For any set T , the notation t← T denotes
an event that t is chosen from the set T uniformly at random, namely T can be
regarded as a random variable representing the uniform distribution on T . For any
deterministic or randomized algorithm A on M, let A(X) be a random variable
representing the distribution of outputs ofA whose input x ∈M is chosen according
to X, namely Pr[a ← A(X)] = Pr[x ← X, a ← A(x)]. For any function f :M→
R, the notation E
x←X
f(x) denotes the expected value of f under the condition that
x is chosen according to X, namely E
x←X
f(x) =
∑
x∈M
Pr[X = x]f(x).
3. Biometric systems and entropy
Let U be a finite set consisting of all users who have biometric characteristics
utilized in BTP algorithms. Assume that each user u ∈ U has his/her own biometric
characteristic bu and therefore, in the following, we identify u with bu and use the
notation u instead of bu, namely, the set U can be regarded as a set consisting of
all individuals’ biometric characteristics (e.g., a right index finger, a face and so
on).
When a biometric characteristic u ∈ U is presented to the sensor, biometric
samples (e.g., fingerprint images, face images and so on) are captured from the pre-
sented characteristic and a set of biometric features is extracted from the captured
biometric samples. We assume that each set of biometric features is represented
as an element x of a finite set M and called a feature element. Since two fea-
ture elements generated from a characteristic u are rarely identical, we can regard
the above feature element extraction procedure EXT as a randomized algorithm
which takes as input a biometric characteristic u ∈ U and returns a feature element
x ∈M.
A comparison algorithm CMP is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input
two feature elements x, x′ ∈ M and returns “match” if, in some manner, x and
x′ are decided to be extracted from the same user’s characteristic, and otherwise
returns “non-match”. We call the tuple Θ = (U ,M,EXT,CMP) a biometric
system. In this paper, we assume that the adversary knows the whole information
about Θ.
Here we introduce the minimum entropy (cf. [3, 4]) for a biometric system.
Definition 1 (Minimum entropy (cf. [3, 4])). For any biometric system
Θ, the minimum entropy H∞(Θ) of Θ is defined by
H∞(Θ) = min
y∈M
(
− log2 E
x←EXT(U)
Pr [CMP(x, y) = “match” | x← EXT(U)]
)
(1)
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= − log2max
y∈M
(
E
x←EXT(U)
Pr[CMP(x, y) = “match” | x← EXT(U)]
)
.
Une, Otsuka, Imai [11, 19] propose a security measure for a biometric system,
the wolf attack probability, which is defined as the maximum success probability
of the wolf adversaries who attempt to impersonate a user by presenting a feature
element which matches as many users’ feature elements as possible, where the
adversaries are allowed to take as input only information independent of the user to
be impersonated. For any biometric system Θ, relaxing computational limitations
of the wolf adversaries, we have H∞(Θ) = − log2WAPΘ, where WAPΘ denotes
the wolf attack probability of Θ.
4. Biometric template protection algorithms
In this section, we give an explicit formulation of biometric template protection
(BTP ) algorithms.
Definition 2 (BTP algorithms [5]). A biometric template protection
(BTP) algorithm Π = (Gen,Prt,Rcg) associated with the biometric system Θ =
(U ,M,EXT,CMP) of minimum entropy k consists of three polynomial-time (in k)
algorithms. The parameter generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security
parameter k and returns a set of some common parameters p2 including the secu-
rity parameter k. The protection algorithm Prt is a randomized algorithm which
takes as input a feature element x ∈ M and the common parameters p, and re-
turns a protected template Ξ. The recognition algorithm Rcg is a deterministic
algorithm which takes as input a new feature element x′ ∈M, a protected template
Ξ and the common parameters p, and returns either “match” or “non-match”.
Definition 3 (Correctness). A BTP algorithm Π = (Gen,Prt,Rcg) as-
sociated with a biometric system Θ = (U ,M,EXT,CMP) is said to be correct if,
for any x, x′ ∈M, CMP(x, x′) =“match” implies Rcg(Prt(x), x′) =“match”.
Definition 4 (Validity). A BTP algorithm Π = (Gen,Prt,Rcg) associated
with a biometric system Θ = (U ,M,EXT,CMP) is said to be valid if, for any
x, x′ ∈M, Rcg(Prt(x), x′) =“match” implies CMP(x, x′) =“match”.
5. Irreversibility
Let Π = (Gen,Prt,Rcg) be a BTP algorithm. When the adversary obtains
a protected template, he might be able to recover a feature element close to the
2 Here p may be just the security parameter k or include some additional information such as
setup information. For example, in a fuzzy commitment scheme [9], p includes, in addition to k,
the parity check matrix or the generator matrix of the employed linear error-correcting code and
a hash function used to create public keys.
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original feature element, create a forgery from the recovered feature element, and
impersonate the user by presenting the forgery to the system. The security notion,
irreversibility, requires that such recovering of feature elements from protected
templates is hard, namely for any polynomial-time adversary given a protected
template Ξ, it is computationally hard to recover a feature element y ∈ M such
that Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match”. To formalize the security notion, irreversibility, we will
deﬁne Irreversibility (IRR) Game between the challenger Ch and the adversary
A = (A1,A2), where A1 is a probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) algorithm which
takes as input the common parameters p and sends a state st to another ppt
algorithm A2, and A2 takes as input the state st and a protected template Ξ, and
attempts to guess a feature element satisfying Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match”.
The following formalization of IRR Game is almost the same as {PI,AD}-
pseudo authorized leakage irreversibility game deﬁned in [5] and is simpler than
irreversibility game deﬁned in [14] in which the adversary obtains two protected
templates generated from two feature elements suﬃciently close to each other and
attempts to recover either of the feature elements.
Definition 5 (Irreversibility (IRR) Game (cf. [5, 14])).
Setup. A BTP algorithm Π = (Gen,Prt,Rcg) associated with the biometric system
Θ = (U ,M,EXT,CMP) of minimum entropy k is set up.
Step 1. The challenger Ch inputs the security parameter k into Gen, receives the
parameters p output from Gen, and sends p to the adversary A1.
Step 2. The adversary A1 receives p and sends a state st to A2.
Step 3. The challenger Ch chooses a biometric characteristic u ∈ U uniformly at
random, obtains a protected template Ξ← Prt(EXT(u)), and sends Ξ to the
adversary A2.
Step 4. The adversary A2 receives the state st and the protected template Ξ from
A1 and Ch, respectively, and returns y ∈M.
If Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match”, then the adversary A = (A1,A2) wins.
Here we deﬁne the advantage AdvIRRΠ,A(k) of the adversary A in the above IRR
Game by
AdvIRRΠ,A(k) = Pr[A wins in IRR Game]−
1
2k
Definition 6 (Irreversibility (cf. [5, 10])). Fix a positive function ε(k)
of k. We say a BTP algorithm Π is ε(k)-irreversible if AdvIRRΠ,A(k) < ε(k) for any
ppt adversary A in IRR Game.
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6. Unlinkability
If the adversary given two protected templates can determine whether the pro-
tected templates are generated from the same characteristic or not, the leakage of
multiple protected templates together with access logs might cause many privacy
problems. The security notion, unlinkability, requires that such a linking attack is
hard, namely for any polynomial-time adversary given two protected template Ξ
and Ξ′, it is computationally hard to determine whether the protected templates
originate from the same characteristic or not. To formalize the security notion,
unlinkability, we will deﬁne Unlinkability (UNLINK) Game between the challenger
Ch and the adversary A = (A1,A2).
Definition 7 (Unlinkability (UNLINK) Game (cf. [5, 14])).
Setup. A BTP algorithm Π = (Gen,Prt,Rcg) associated with the biometric system
Θ = (U ,M,EXT,CMP) of minimum entropy k is set up.
Step 1. The challenger Ch inputs the security parameter k into Gen, receives the
parameters p output from Gen, and sends p to the adversary A1.
Step 2. The adversary A1 receives p and sends a state st to A2.
Step 3. The challenger Ch chooses a biometric characteristic u ∈ U uniformly
at random, obtains a feature element x ← EXT(u), and moreover obtains a
protected template Ξ← Prt(x).
Then Ch flips the random coin b ∈ {0, 1}.
If b = 0, then Ch obtains another protected template Ξ′ ← Prt(x) by inputting
the same feature element x.
If b = 1, then Ch again chooses a biometric characteristic v ∈ U uniformly
at random and obtains a protected template Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(v)).
The challenger sends (Ξ,Ξ′) to the adversary A2.
Step 4. The adversary A2 receives the state st and (Ξ,Ξ′) from A1 and Ch, re-
spectively, and returns b′ ∈ {0, 1} as a guess of b.
If b′ = b, then the adversary A = (A1,A2) wins.
The adversary in the above UNLINK Game is weaker than that in {PI,AD}-
unlink game deﬁned in [5] and is stronger than that in indistinguishability game
deﬁned in [14]. In {PI,AD}-unlink game deﬁned in [5], original feature elements
are chosen by the adversary. In indistinguishability game deﬁned in [14], if b = 0,
the second protected template Ξ′ is generated from a feature element x′ suﬃciently
close to x.
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The advantage AdvUNLINKΠ,A (k) of the adversary A in the above UNLINK Game
is deﬁned by
AdvUNLINKΠ,A (k) =
∣∣2Pr [A wins in UNLINK Game]− 1∣∣ (2)
Definition 8 (Unlinkability). Fix a positive function ε(k) of k. We say
that a BTP algorithm Π is ε(k)-unlinkable if AdvUNLINKΠ,A (k) < ε(k) for any ppt
adversary A in UNLINK Game.
7. Relation between Irreversibilty and Unlinkabilty
In this section, we show that unlinkability is a stronger notion than irreversibil-
ity for any correct and valid BTP algorithm.
Theorem 9. Fix a positive function ε(k) of k. For any correct and valid BTP
algorithm Π associated with the biometric system Θ of minimum entropy k, if Π is
ε(k)-unlinkable, then Π is ε(k)-irreversible.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that if there exists an adversary A = (A1,A2)
in IRR Game satisfying AdvIRRΠ,A(k) ≥ ε(k), then there exists an adversary B =
(B1,B2) in UNLINK Game satisfying AdvUNLINKΠ,B (k) ≥ ε(k).
Deﬁne the adversary B = (B1,B2) by using the adversary A = (A1,A2) as
follows.
The adversary B1 The adversary B1 receives p from the challenger Ch, obtains
a state st← A1(p), and sends the state st to the adversary B2.
The adversary B2 The adversary B2 receives the state st and (Ξ,Ξ′) from B1
and Ch, respectively. Then B2 obtains a feature element y ← A2(Ξ, st).
If Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match” and Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“match”, then B2 returns b′ = 0.
If Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match” and Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“non-match”, then B2 returns b′ = 1.
If Rcg(Ξ, y) =“non-match”, then B2 returns b′ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
When b = 0, there are the following two cases in which the adversary B correctly
returns b′ = 0.
Case 1. A2 guesses a feature element y satisfying Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match”.
In this case, from validity of Π, for the original feature element x of Ξ,
CMP(x, y) =“match”. Then, from correctness of Π, Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“match”
since Ξ′ is also generated from x.
Case 2. A2 guesses a feature element y satisfying Rcg(Ξ, y) =“non-match” and
B2 chooses b′ = 0 from {0, 1} with probability 1
2
.
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6. Unlinkability
If the adversary given two protected templates can determine whether the pro-
tected templates are generated from the same characteristic or not, the leakage of
multiple protected templates together with access logs might cause many privacy
problems. The security notion, unlinkability, requires that such a linking attack is
hard, namely for any polynomial-time adversary given two protected template Ξ
and Ξ′, it is computationally hard to determine whether the protected templates
originate from the same characteristic or not. To formalize the security notion,
unlinkability, we will deﬁne Unlinkability (UNLINK) Game between the challenger
Ch and the adversary A = (A1,A2).
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Step 2. The adversary A1 receives p and sends a state st to A2.
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protected template Ξ← Prt(x).
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the same feature element x.
If b = 1, then Ch again chooses a biometric characteristic v ∈ U uniformly
at random and obtains a protected template Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(v)).
The challenger sends (Ξ,Ξ′) to the adversary A2.
Step 4. The adversary A2 receives the state st and (Ξ,Ξ′) from A1 and Ch, re-
spectively, and returns b′ ∈ {0, 1} as a guess of b.
If b′ = b, then the adversary A = (A1,A2) wins.
The adversary in the above UNLINK Game is weaker than that in {PI,AD}-
unlink game deﬁned in [5] and is stronger than that in indistinguishability game
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that a BTP algorithm Π is ε(k)-unlinkable if AdvUNLINKΠ,A (k) < ε(k) for any ppt
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In this section, we show that unlinkability is a stronger notion than irreversibil-
ity for any correct and valid BTP algorithm.
Theorem 9. Fix a positive function ε(k) of k. For any correct and valid BTP
algorithm Π associated with the biometric system Θ of minimum entropy k, if Π is
ε(k)-unlinkable, then Π is ε(k)-irreversible.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that if there exists an adversary A = (A1,A2)
in IRR Game satisfying AdvIRRΠ,A(k) ≥ ε(k), then there exists an adversary B =
(B1,B2) in UNLINK Game satisfying AdvUNLINKΠ,B (k) ≥ ε(k).
Deﬁne the adversary B = (B1,B2) by using the adversary A = (A1,A2) as
follows.
The adversary B1 The adversary B1 receives p from the challenger Ch, obtains
a state st← A1(p), and sends the state st to the adversary B2.
The adversary B2 The adversary B2 receives the state st and (Ξ,Ξ′) from B1
and Ch, respectively. Then B2 obtains a feature element y ← A2(Ξ, st).
If Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match” and Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“match”, then B2 returns b′ = 0.
If Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match” and Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“non-match”, then B2 returns b′ = 1.
If Rcg(Ξ, y) =“non-match”, then B2 returns b′ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
When b = 0, there are the following two cases in which the adversary B correctly
returns b′ = 0.
Case 1. A2 guesses a feature element y satisfying Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match”.
In this case, from validity of Π, for the original feature element x of Ξ,
CMP(x, y) =“match”. Then, from correctness of Π, Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“match”
since Ξ′ is also generated from x.
Case 2. A2 guesses a feature element y satisfying Rcg(Ξ, y) =“non-match” and
B2 chooses b′ = 0 from {0, 1} with probability 1
2
.
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Therefore, we have
Pr[B returns b′ = 0 b = 0]
= E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
(
Pr
[
y ← A2(Ξ, st),
Rcg(Ξ, y) = “match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
]
+ Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),Rcg(Ξ, y) = “non-match”,
b′ = 0← {0, 1}
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
)
=Pr[A wins in IRR Game] + 1
2
Pr[A loses in IRR Game]
=
1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
When b = 1, there are the following two cases in which the adversary B correctly
returns b′ = 1.
Case 1. A2 guesses a feature element y satisfying Rcg(Ξ, y) =“match” and
Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“non-match”.
Case 2. A2 guesses a feature element y satisfying Rcg(Ξ, y) =“non-match” and
B2 chooses b′ = 1 from {0, 1} with probability 1
2
.
Therefore, we have
Pr[B returns b′ = 1 b = 1]
= E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
(
Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),Rcg(Ξ, y) = “match”,
Rcg(Ξ′, y) = “non-match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))

+ Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),Rcg(Ξ, y) = “non-match”,
b′ = 1← {0, 1}
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
)
=1− E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
Pr

y ← A2(Ξ, st),
Rcg(Ξ, y) = “non-match”
or
Rcg(Ξ′, y) = “match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))

+
1
2
Pr[A loses in IRR Game]
≥1−
(
E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
(
Pr
[
y ← A2(Ξ, st),
Rcg(Ξ, y) = “non-match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
]
Relation between irreversibility and unlinkability 63
+ E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),
Rcg(Ξ′, y) = “match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
)
+
1
2
Pr[A loses in IRR Game]
=Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
− E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
x′ ← EXT(U)
Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),
CMP(x′, y) = “match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
x′ ← EXT(U)
)
+
1
2
(
1− Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
where x′ is the original feature element of Ξ′. Since A2 takes as input Ξ and st
which are information independent of the event x′ ← EXT(U), the probability that
A2 guess a feature element y satisfying CMP(x′, x) =“match” is less than or equals
to
1
2k
from Deﬁnition 1 of the minimum entropy. Then we have
Pr[B returns b′ = 1 b = 1] ≥ 1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
− 1
2k
Consequently we have
2Pr[B in UNLINK Game wins]− 1
=2
(
Pr[b = 0]Pr[b′ = 0 | b = 0] + Pr[b = 1]Pr[b′ = 1 | b = 1]
)
− 1
=Pr[b′ = 0 | b = 0] + Pr[b′ = 1 | b = 1]− 1
≥1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
+
1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
− 1
2k
− 1
=Pr[A wins in IRR Game]− 1
2k
= AdvIRRΠ,A(k) ≥ ε(k)
Therefore we have
AdvUNLINKΠ,B (k) =
��2Pr[B in UNLINK Game wins]− 1�� ≥ ε(k)
Hence, the result follows. □
In general, unlinkability is properly stronger than irreversibility. For example,
under the assumption that EXT(U) is a uniform distribution on M, a fuzzy com-
mitment scheme [9] achieves suﬃciently strong irreversibility but cannot achieve
similarly strong unlinkability. Namely, for any ppt IRR Game adversary, the ad-
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Therefore, we have
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2
Pr[A loses in IRR Game]
=
1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
When b = 1, there are the following two cases in which the adversary B correctly
returns b′ = 1.
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Rcg(Ξ′, y) =“non-match”.
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B2 chooses b′ = 1 from {0, 1} with probability 1
2
.
Therefore, we have
Pr[B returns b′ = 1 b = 1]
= E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
(
Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),Rcg(Ξ, y) = “match”,
Rcg(Ξ′, y) = “non-match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))

+ Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),Rcg(Ξ, y) = “non-match”,
b′ = 1← {0, 1}
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
)
=1− E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
Pr

y ← A2(Ξ, st),
Rcg(Ξ, y) = “non-match”
or
Rcg(Ξ′, y) = “match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))

+
1
2
Pr[A loses in IRR Game]
≥1−
(
E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
(
Pr
[
y ← A2(Ξ, st),
Rcg(Ξ, y) = “non-match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
]
Relation between irreversibility and unlinkability 63
+ E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
Ξ′ ← Prt(EXT(U))
Pr
 y ← A2(Ξ, st),
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)
+
1
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Pr[A loses in IRR Game]
=Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
− E
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
x′ ← EXT(U)
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 y ← A2(Ξ, st),
CMP(x′, y) = “match”
st← A1(Gen(k))
Ξ← Prt(EXT(U))
x′ ← EXT(U)
)
+
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2
(
1− Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
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where x′ is the original feature element of Ξ′. Since A2 takes as input Ξ and st
which are information independent of the event x′ ← EXT(U), the probability that
A2 guess a feature element y satisfying CMP(x′, x) =“match” is less than or equals
to
1
2k
from Deﬁnition 1 of the minimum entropy. Then we have
Pr[B returns b′ = 1 b = 1] ≥ 1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
− 1
2k
Consequently we have
2Pr[B in UNLINK Game wins]− 1
=2
(
Pr[b = 0]Pr[b′ = 0 | b = 0] + Pr[b = 1]Pr[b′ = 1 | b = 1]
)
− 1
=Pr[b′ = 0 | b = 0] + Pr[b′ = 1 | b = 1]− 1
≥1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
+
1
2
(
1 + Pr[A wins in IRR Game]
)
− 1
2k
− 1
=Pr[A wins in IRR Game]− 1
2k
= AdvIRRΠ,A(k) ≥ ε(k)
Therefore we have
AdvUNLINKΠ,B (k) =
��2Pr[B in UNLINK Game wins]− 1�� ≥ ε(k)
Hence, the result follows. □
In general, unlinkability is properly stronger than irreversibility. For example,
under the assumption that EXT(U) is a uniform distribution on M, a fuzzy com-
mitment scheme [9] achieves suﬃciently strong irreversibility but cannot achieve
similarly strong unlinkability. Namely, for any ppt IRR Game adversary, the ad-
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versary’s advantage is negligible, but there exists a ppt UNLINK Game adversary
whose advantage is not negligible (cf. [14]).
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce explicit formalizations of two important security no-
tions, irreversibility and unlinkability, for BTP algorithms and prove that unlink-
ability is a stronger security notion than irreversibility. For simplicity, we assume
that BTP algorithms are strictly correct and valid. In general, a BTP algorithm is
correct and nearly valid, or valid and nearly correct. As a future work, we need to
give the proof under such a general assumption.
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